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A team of interdisciplinary experts funded by DARPA is in the process of
developing a Resource Management System termed MSHN (a Management System for
Heterogeneous Networks). MSHN's primary function is to accept a sequence ofjobs, and
intelligently determine what jobs should be executed on which machines and when. It is
designed to take both machine affinity and loads into account, thus providing superior
performance and Quality of Service (QoS). The current prototype of MSHN does not
provide protection against the threats of inadvertent disclosure and corruption of sensitive
information and resources. A rigorous security analysis ofMSHN is the first step required
to successfully incorporate security into the MSHN project.
The approach taken was to analyze MSHN's architecture, information flow
diagrams and user interfaces and explain how fundamental security concepts may be
applied to MSHN. By exercising the MSHN simulator, this work was able to expose
many security weaknesses and outline conceivable methods of exploitation.
As a result of this effort, a security policy tailored to MSHN is proposed, a
functional breakout process based on the principle of least privilege between common user
interface capabilities and administration capabilities is provided, and finally design
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As computing resources diversify and data becomes distributed throughout the
nation and the world, a growing common need exists: the ability to intelligently manage a
distributed, heterogeneous computational network and its corresponding resources. A
team of interdisciplinary experts funded by DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency) is in the process of developing a scheduling framework termed MSHN 1 (a
Management System for Heterogeneous Networks). MSHN's primary function is to
accept a sequence ofjobs, and determine what jobs should be executed on which machines
and when. MSHN will incorporate innovative approaches to scheduling and apply
advanced job monitoring capabilities to achieve superior performance and meet Quality of
Service (QoS) requirements. This distinguishes it from the more traditional Resource
Management Systems (RMSs).
One of the many issues being addressed as part of the design and prototyping of
MSHN is security. This thesis provides a first step in understanding how security can be
incorporated into MSHN. Fundamental security concepts applicable to MSHN are
presented. Security policies in the context of heterogeneous systems are discussed. This
work examines security vulnerabilities in the user interface of MSHN's predecessor, and
concludes with a discussion of the security weaknesses ofMSHN's architecture.
1 MSHN is pronounced "Mission"
The results of this research are twofold. First, we furnish sufficient background on
MSHN and how security objectives, principles, and policies may be applied. Also, we
provide guidance as to where future studies should focus in order to permit MSHN to
balance the enforcement of the security policy against satisfying other QoS obligations.
B. BACKGROUND
MSHN is a program that is building upon the experiences of the SmartNet
scheduling framework. SmartNet' s genesis was from a paper written in 1991 by Richard
Freund, entitled "SuperC or Distributed Heterogeneous HPC [Ref 1]. This paper
viewed the scheduling of multiple and independent compute intensive tasks as a linear
programming problem. Later, Freund continued his initial work by forming a design and
research team at the Naval Command and Control, Ocean Surveillance Center, Research,
Development, Testing and Evaluation Division (NRaD), leading to the creation of
SmartNet in 1993. SmartNet became operational in early 1994. Its team has consisted at
times of upwards of 25 members, some doing research, others development, and still
others product support.
SmartNet has and is being used by many government agencies, including NTH
(National Institutes of Health), DARPA, NCAR (National Center for Atmospheric
Research), and the US Navy. Presently, SmartNet is known as a scheduling framework
for managing tasks in heterogeneous environments. Initially designed for coordinating
computationally bound HPC tasks, it has been expanded and generalized to operate in the
more typical distributed environment generally in use today.
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The security architecture, like the overall architecture ofMSHN, is currently under
development. The foundation for this thesis is based on the designers' vision for MSHN's
architecture, capabilities, and usage.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
This section provides an overview of each chapter's contents and purpose.
1. Introduction
Chapter I discusses the purpose, background, and scope of this thesis.
2. MSHN Profile
Chapter II describes MSHN's objectives. MSHN's purpose, components, and
configurations are explained in detail. The innovations and unique characteristics that
MSHN embodies, through its predecessor SmartNet, are presented. The chapter
concludes by outlining the configuration ofMSHN that will be used for study throughout
this thesis.
3. Overview of Computer Security
Chapter III provides a brief review of computer security as it is applicable to the
analysis ofMSHN. Fundamental security terms, concepts, and goals are introduced. The
chapter addresses such topics as security objectives, security models, and security
functions and mechanisms. The chapter will end with a discussion of the Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria, which provides a basis for gauging the confidence
with which a security policy is correctly enforced by commercial products. This chapter
will assist the reader in gaining a rudimentary understanding of computer security and
build a basis for the subsequent security analysis ofMSHN.
4. Quality of Service
Chapter IV explores the notion of Quality of Service (QoS). Its definition and
quantification are examined. We explain how MSHN may support QoS requirements for
applications taking advantage of MSHN's resource management services. How security
can be viewed as a service, how security requirements affect other services, and the
implications of having multiple security policies will be discussed.
5. Security Policy and Interpretation for MSHN
Chapter V discusses security policies that could be adopted by MSHN.
Statements of intent with regard to the control of access to information and its
dissemination are declared and expounded upon. This chapter is an essential step in
transforming MSHN into a secure system.
6. Interface Analysis
Chapter VI analyzes the user interface ofMSHN's predecessor, SmartNet, from a
security perspective. Vulnerabilities that may lead to the denial of service, the corruption
of data and applications, and the unintended disclosure of sensitive information are
exposed. This chapter provides guidance for the development of MSHN's interface such
that security relevant interface functions will be clearly separated from those other
functions that are security neutral.
7. Conclusions
Chapter VII provides a summary of this research and gives recommendations for
the direction of future research toward the incorporation of security into MSHN.

H. MSHN PROFILE
This chapter provides an overview of the Management System for Heterogeneous
Networks (MSHN). Although MSHN is still in the design phase of its development, it's
objective, requirements and basic architecture are well founded. For the ease of writing
this portrait ofMSHN, we will use the present tense. The majority of this chapter is based
on several sources. These include the documentation for SmartNet [Refs. 2, and 3], the
unpublished notes of one of the designers [Ref. 4], and discussions held at a MSHN
Investigator Meeting [Ref. 5].
A. SETTING
1. Purpose
MSHN is a scheduling framework for managing jobs and resources in a
heterogeneous computational environment. Given a set ofjobs, MSHN determines where
and when each job should execute in order to run a set of jobs while maximizing some
performance criteria, such as executing them in the smallest possible amount of time. It
achieves its superior performance through its comprehensive view of the virtual
heterogeneous machine (VHM) and its intimate knowledge of the jobs being scheduled.
"The VHM is the set of machines and resources MSHN is installed to operate with." [Ref.
4] MSHN's view of the VHM encompasses not only resource loads and job progress, but
resource capability and affinity as well. MSHN is able to use this view to determine and
implement the best schedule satisfying the requirements of the jobs it executes. MSHN
possesses user interfaces enabling the performance power of the heterogeneous
environment to be harnessed.
2. Scheduling Framework
MSHN is neither a scheduler nor a Resource Management System (RMS) but a
more robust composition called a scheduling framework. The scheduler is a limited
component of this greater system. Its only function is to decide where to run each job. It
depends on other mechanisms to gather and provide the necessary information, and to
implement the schedules it generates. An RMS incorporates a basic scheduler and, in
addition, the ability to execute jobs and monitor their progress. It customarily applies a
load balancing methodology for deciding where jobs should execute. A Scheduling
Framework possesses the qualities of an RMS and a Scheduler but also contains a larger
spectrum of functionality.
The broad range of capabilities possessed by a Scheduling Framework
distinguishes it from an RMS. MSHN offers many different scheduling and search
strategies for managing resources and jobs. It provides an interface to the user for
monitoring the state of the VHM and the jobs being executed on the VHM. It is able to
learn by accumulating a history of performance data and can make intelligent decisions
based upon on that history. MSHN also is able to deal with the uncertainty that is intrinsic
in distributed environments. From a developer's perspective, perhaps MSHN's greatest
asset is its modular design, which facilitates its ready adaptation to different operating
environments.
3. Innovations ofMSHN
The MSHN project is a departure from past approaches to distributed computing.
The following six distinct innovations make MSHN unique and contribute to its increased
performance, functionality and flexibility. These are:
• its ability to recognize and exploit the heterogeneity present in modern
distributed computing architectures,
• its development and use of what are termed an application's Compute
Characteristics,
• its ability to track and account for uncertainty,
• its ability to account for the sharing of resources in a distributed environment,
• its separation of the optimization criteria from the search engine, and
• the methods it employs to search the scheduling space for a satisfactory
solution to the optimization criteria.
All computer architectures have different capabilities. A given architecture
provides varying degrees of processing performance, data storage capacity, and data
transmission ability. In addition, some architectures are better suited to handle particular
types of applications than are others. "The MSHN team was aware of such performance
differences and hypothesized that a distributed collection of machines with diverse
architectures would be able to provide a collective performance equal to that of the best
machine." [Ref 4] MSHN embodies this philosophy and is designed to leverage the
heterogeneity inherent in different computer architectures.
The runtimes of most computer jobs are not very predictable. "Runtime
distributions typically have a very wide variance and are multi-modal in nature." [Ref. 3]
This unpredictability complicates and undermines the effort to optimally schedule a series
ofjobs. The MSHN development team recognizes this problem and is devising a scheme
to address this challenge through the use of what are called Compute Characteristics. A
job's runtime distribution can be divided into pieces delineated by these Compute
Characteristics. "Compute Characteristics are most easily defined in terms of deterministic
jobs executing in a quiescent system with no wait." [Ref. 3]
"The distributed environment is inherently non-deterministic. Machines are
operating asynchronously, sharing resources, and executing a host of different jobs
simultaneously." [Ref. 3] The developers of MSHN are able to account for this
uncertainty and use their knowledge of it to increase the performance ofMSHN.
The sharing of resources, such as memory, the central processing unit, and disk
space, is a fundamental concern in of distributed processing. MSHN builds on the
previous research that has been done in these areas, and also is pioneering the allocation of
other resources, in particular, the network-based resources. "The MSHN team initiated
the generalization of this work to include other shared distributed resources such as file
servers and memory." [Ref. 3]
The MSHN scheduler is designed modularly. This design allows the introduction
of additional components, termed optimization engines, containing new optimization
criteria so long as they satisfy the interface requirements of the scheduler. In addition,
MSHN permits the development of sophisticated optimization criteria that can utilize the
information available in the MSHN database. The MSHN database is large and contains
data useful to a broad range of optimization strategies.
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The MSHN scheduler not only contains multiple optimization criteria but also
several search engines. "The search engine explores the solution space for a good
schedule as defined by the criteria in the optimization engine." [Ref. 3] The MSHN
scheduler is also designed to allow the rapid development and integration of new search
engines. The interface requirements for a search engine are subject to the same scheduler
interface characteristics required of an optimization engine. Search engines in MSHN
implement greedy, fast greedy, and evolutionary programming-based algorithms.
B. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
1. Components
MSHN's architecture is divided into four different modules (see Figure 1). These
are the Scheduler, Database, Learning/Accounting Process, and Controller. The
Scheduler's function is to decide where and when jobs are to be executed, taking into
account the types and availability of computational resources. The Database stores all the
information required by MSHN to intelligently schedule and execute pending jobs. The
Learning/Accounting process module allows MSHN to gather historical and statistical
data for its scheduling and job management functions, and to track cost accounting data.
The Controller is the main organizing process for MSHN, coordinating and implementing
most of its internal activity and external interactions.
The Scheduler module is the scheduling mechanism of MSHN. Its purpose is to
schedule the submitted jobs such that the best possible performance is achieved.
Performance is defined in terms of user and administrator QoS metrics and the relative
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weighting of these metrics. For example, a common administrator QoS metric is the time
it takes to execute all the jobs in the queue. MSHN achieves its high level of performance
by matching jobs with the machines and resources that are best suited to process that job.
In addition to the above-mentioned QoS metrics, the Scheduler decides this suitability by
also taking into account sequencing, concurrency, cost, machine and resource
dependencies, and the state of the VHM. The Scheduler relies on the MSHN database to
supply this required information. "In truth, the MSHN Scheduler is really a family of
scheduling algorithms, each designed to optimize system performance based upon
different optimization criteria and constraints." [Ref 4] The user can select which
optimization and search engines to deploy or leave this decision to MSHN. This family of
schedulers is not static. New optimization and search engines can be easily added and
existing ones enhanced.
The MSHN Database stores and provides information about the past, current, and
(estimated) future state of the MSHN environment. It maintains a record of the progress
of active jobs and the location of the data they require. It also maintains a historical
record of the performance and system requirements of submitted jobs, of the loads and
states of all the resources available or in use, and of the global VHM.
The Learning/Accounting process has two primary functions. The Accounting
function records accounting information and costs associated with the jobs being managed
by MSHN. The Learning function produces a wide variety of experiential data concerning
the performance of jobs and resources. The Learning function is one of the primary
components that enables MSHN to make intelligent decisions. Using a variety of
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statistical and filtering techniques, the Learning function can measure and provide the
Scheduler and Controller with both directly and indirectly measurable statistical quantities.
The Controller is the center of the MSHN Scheduling Framework. It is
responsible for most of the initiation and control of MSHN's actions and the overall
management of its components. Its duties and functions are numerous. These include:
regulating interaction with the user via the interface,
requesting schedules,
recognizing scheduling and rescheduling events,
maintaining accurate predictions of resource and VHM loads,
updating state information in the MSHN database,
monitoring job progress,
maintaining the job queues,
making sure jobs don't violate their cost limits,
initiating data movement,
executing, terminating, blocking, and migrating jobs,
adding and removing machines and resources from its VHM, and






















Control Information Request Information Data Information
Figure 1. MSHN Basic Architecture [Ref. 3].
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2. Configurations
MSHN is designed to operate in one of three different configurations: as a stand-
alone environment, as an RMS advisor, or as a coordinator of many RMSs. Depending
upon the configuration used, MSHN will exhibit different behavioral characteristics,
performance, and capability. For each configuration, different components of Figure 1 are
implemented.
MSHN can be configured to function as its own environment. In this
configuration, it has explicit control over some of the resources and users of the VHM
while having no direct control over others. It is able to accept job requests for execution,
identify the correct machine and appropriate time for execution, ensure that data are
routed properly, and finally execute the jobs. It has the means to directly interface with
the machines and resources it controls, administer the users of MSHN, and monitor the
state of the VHM. In this operational mode, the RMS box at the bottom of Figure 1 is left
off.
MSHN can also be configured to perform duties as an RMS advisor. In this role,
the original scheduling engine of the RMS is replaced by MSHN. MSHN's single purpose
is to generate a recommended schedule of job execution. It accomplishes this by
accepting from the RMS the lists ofjobs to be executed, the VHM state information (i.e.,
the machines and resources available, and their current loads), and any dependency and
constraint information with respect to both the jobs and resources. The RMS accepts the
recommended schedule and uses it to coordinate its jobs. In this configuration, MSHN
does not directly command the resources of the VHM. It is the RMS, which acts as the
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controlling agent. This use of MSHN prevents the RMS, and ultimately the user, from
taking full advantage of the unique and effective features of MSHN. This is because the
majority of the information MSHN requires to optimally schedule jobs is neither available
nor tracked by current RMSs (e.g., past performance and resource architecture). In this
configuration, the Execution and Administration interfaces of Figure 1 are omitted, their
functionality being the responsibility of the RMS being advised, and all the boxes at the
bottom of Figure 1 are left off except that entitled "RMS."
The third configuration of MSHN is as an RMS manager. In this form, MSHN
takes on the role of a coordinator of multiple RMSs. As a coordinator, MSHN has the
capability to migrate jobs from one RMS's domain to that belonging to another, query an
RMS on the status of its jobs, and redirect the results of those jobs. These actions
enhance the overall performance of the collective RMSs. In this role, MSHN also
maintains the ability to interact directly with the user. The user's jobs are submitted
directly to MSHN for later delegation to an RMS for execution.
3. Interfaces
There are two classes ofMSHN interfaces. One is the internal class consisting of
those designed to interface to the people who use MSHN. The other is the external
interface that structures and regulates MSHN's interaction with the resources and RMSs
ofthe VHM.
The internal class Consists of two distinct human interfaces. One is termed the
Execution Interface; the other, the Administration Interface. The Execution interface is
provided for the typical user whose concerns focus on MSHN's ability to accept and
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execute his jobs. The Execution Interface possesses the functionality required for a user
to:
• submit an application to be executed,
• provide any special instructions concerning it,
• monitor the application's progress,
• display, direct, or save their application's output, and
• perform rudimentary control functions (e.g., to terminate or dequeue a job).
The Administrative interface is provided for the MSHN administrator. The
requirements of the administrator exceed those of a user. The capabilities provided by the
Administrative interface allow the administrator to support the correct operation of
MSHN. The Administrative interface possesses the functionality required to:
• permit new job records to be placed into the Database,
• permit existing job records in the Database to be updated/modified,
• permit resources to be added/removed from the VHM,
• monitor the VHM (i.e., the load on the resources and the progress ofjobs),
• resolve scheduling conflicts, and
• access MSHN's replay, debugging, and diagnostic tools.
The External interfaces of MSHN are used to interact with the resources of the
VHM. Depending on the configuration of MSHN, the interfaces may also be used to
regulate interactions with the compute facilities, and the corresponding machines at these
17
sites that MSHN controls; the RMSs that it advises; and the collection of RMSs MSHN
manages. These interfaces reside with in the MSHN Controller.
C. CONFIGURATION FOR STUDY
The remainder of this study will be restricted to and focus on the stand-alone
configuration ofMSHN. Also, we will assume that the individual resources of the VHM
will not individually possess multilevel security classifications and will also maintain their
single security classification.
18
m. OVERVIEW OF COMPUTER SECURITY
Before continuing, it is necessary to examine the issues that underlie computer
security and their impact on MSHN. Computer security is a very complex and broad
subject. Security concerns have been in existence since the birth of the computer age and
have increased with the growth of the industry. It is not our objective to present an all-
encompassing discussion of computer security in this section. However, this chapter is
meant to assist the reader in gaining an appreciation for some of the fundamental
principles of computer security, to introduce the essential terms and concepts, and to build
a basis for a security analysis ofMSHN.
A. FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY CONCEPTS
A simplistic but meaningful definition for Computer Security is embodied by the
following quote from Practical Unix & Internet Security: "A computer is secure if you
can depend on it and its software behaves as you expect." [Ref. 6] While this supplies us
with a conceptual handle on security, it relies heavily on the user's interpretation of
"depend" and "expect." In the rest of this section, we will examine: 1) the fundamental
security objectives, the requirements needed to achieve them and their articulation in what
is termed a security policy; 2) the definition of a security policy; and 3) the functions and
implementation mechanisms needed to meet security policy objectives. Because security
policy enforcement is of critical importance in areas such as national defense, the ability to




The following section defines the three fundamental objectives of computer
security, namely confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In many systems, one of these
objectives may dominate; in others, they may all have equivalent levels of importance. It is
the responsibility ofthe designer of a system to assess which of these objectives are critical
to the user, to prioritize those objectives if necessary, and to make the appropriate design
choices in the construction of the system. For each of these security objectives we
provide an example in the context of the MSHN architecture.
"Confidentiality (sometimes called secrecy) requires that the information in a
computer system and transmitted information be accessible only for reading by authorized
parties." [Ref. 7] The regulation of the access to information by authorized users can be
decided by other users and implemented as discretionary access controls, such as in Unix.
This regulation can also be accomplished by imposing laws and regulations applied to the
labeling of that information resulting in mandatory access controls, such as the rules
governing classified information within the Department of Defense (DoD). Job
characteristics that are stored in the MSHN database, such as a job's past performance on
specific machines, may be required to reflect the sensitivity of that job and should not be
available to unauthorized users. Classified sites that contain resources available to MSHN
should only be accessible by applications possessing the proper security clearance.
"Integrity (sometimes called accuracy) requires that computer system assets and
transmitted information may be modified only by authorized parties." [Ref. 7] The
integrity objective ensures that a system will maintain the continuing correctness of the
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information stored in it. If the integrity of MSHN's Learning/Accounting algorithms is
not guaranteed, then unapproved alterations in the learning heuristics can cause erroneous
updates in the MSHN database. This corrupted data will have a negative effect on the
scheduling algorithms that rely on such data to properly schedule user applications.
Another concern is the integrity of the system files used by MSHN. The accidental or
malicious modification to these files, perhaps via a virus, would cause unwanted
operational behavior to occur.
"Availability requires that computer system assets are available to authorized
parties when needed." [Ref 7] The intent of the availability objective is to insure that the
system, meaning both its software and hardware, is able to guarantee that the information
needed by its users is kept available to those users. A user of MSHN must have
confidence in that he will not be denied authorized access to MSHN. He expects to be
able to submit his jobs to be scheduled. The user must be confident that his jobs will be
executed, that they will finish, and the results returned to him.
2. Security Policy
A security policy is a statement of intent with regard to controlling the access to
and the dissemination of information [Ref. 8]. Security policies can be grouped into two
fundamental classes: Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policies, and Mandatory Access
Control (MAC) policies. DAC controls a subject's access to objects based on the identity
of the subject. The controls are discretionary in the sense that a subject with certain
access permissions (e.g., "control" access) is capable of passing permissions on to any
other subject. For example, Matt and Lynn are engineers at an aerospace company and
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are both authorized to see engineering documents. Matt may choose to give a project
document to Lynn. Here Matt is exercising discretionary access control over an
engineering document. MAC regulates access to objects based on immutable sensitivity
labels associated with objects at the time of their creation and on the formal authorization
(e.g., clearance) of each subject to access information of such sensitivity. [Ref 9] To
continue with the example, Jim works in the same company as Matt and Lynn but is in the
marketing department. Engineers are forbidden to give technical documents to the
marketing people. So, if Matt gives the same project document to Jim, he will violate the
company's mandatory policy and may be fired as a consequence. A more detailed
discussion of security policy and how it relates to MSHN will be presented in Chapter V.
3. Reference Monitor Concept
The Reference Monitor Concept resulted from the Computer Security Technology
Planning Study conducted in 1972 by James P. Anderson & Company [Ref. 10]. The
Reference Monitor Concept provides an abstract ideal with which the actual operation of
security mechanisms can be compared and judged. The Reference Monitor Concept
provides a basis for addressing the multilevel sharing problem. No plausible alternative to
it has been advanced to date. It is believed to represent a necessary and sufficient set of
components for controlling access to information. "It scopes a technically coherent subset
of the entire computer security problem space without trivializing the importance of













Figure 2. Reference Monitor Concept.
The Reference Monitor Concept is an abstraction that provides a high level
methodology for controlling access to passive entities by active entities. The high level
description of the Reference Monitor Concept is formalized in formal security policy
models. Formal security policy models are rigorous logical models of security
functionality through which the policy can be analyzed and the security aspect of system
behavior proven. The Reference Monitor Concept provides a theoretical basis for the
design and implementation of mechanisms for the enforcement of the security policy.
Three design requirements that must be sought by any implementation of the Reference
Monitor Concept are: isolation, completeness, and verifiability. Isolation refers to the
requirement that the reference monitor must be tamperproof. This means that the
reference validation mechanism (RVM) cannot be subject to an external attack which
would modify its policy enforcement properties. Completeness dictates that the reference
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monitor must always be invoiced, viz. every access by every program for data must be
mediated. This does not mean that mediation continues once access to an object
containing data is granted. That would result in unacceptable performance degradation
and is not required to correctly enforce the security policy. Verifiability means the
reference monitor must be small enough to be amenable to analysis and tests to assure
completeness.
Two fundamental components of the Reference Monitor Concept are objects and
subjects. Objects are passive entities that contain or receive information. Some examples
of objects are files, directories, keyboards, video displays, printers, system clocks, memory
segments, and network nodes. Subjects are active entities that cause information to flow
among objects or change the system state. Subjects normally map to people, processes,
and devices. The concept of a device as an active entity emerges from the fact that some
devices that span multiple security levels must contain logic sufficient to correctly handle
variously labeled information.
The Reference Monitor Concept is realized in the imposition of a RVM between
subjects and objects as shown in Figure 2. If a subject requires access to an object, then
the subject invokes the RVM. The RVM accepts the request for access and consults the
authorization database. The content of the database determines if access is granted. If
granted, changes to the current access authorization database are made, and the audit trail
reflects the transaction.
The Reference Monitor Concept is an ideal, and will always be impossible to
achieve in practice. No matter how rigorously security engineering techniques are applied
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to the development of RVMs, or security kernels as they are alternatively called,
imperfections in the software and hardware development process makes it impossible,
from a practical point of view, to design a perfect RVM. Flaws and uncloseable covert
timing channels may remain to allow unauthorized information flow.
4. Trusted Computing Base
To continue our discussion of the abstraction called the Reference Monitor
Concept, we now introduce the idea of a Trusted Computing Base (TCB). It is necessary
to discuss this concept because the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
(TCSEC) uses this term in referring to a perimeter delineating the security relevant
mechanisms used to enforce the security policy from non-security relevant mechanisms.
Thus the TCB may be defined as the smallest isolated subset of the system that
encompasses the functions of both the reference monitor implementation and required
supporting functions (see Figure 3). The TCSEC defines the TCB as:
The totality of protection mechanisms within a computer system - including
hardware, firmware, and software - the combination of which is responsible
for enforcing a security policy. A TCB consists of one or more
components that together enforce a unified security policy over a product
or system. The ability of a TCB to correctly enforce a security policy
depends solely on the mechanisms within the TCB and on the correct input
by the system administrative personnel of parameters (e.g., a user's
clearance) related to the security policy. [Ref 9]
Many ideas proposed in the Reference Monitor Concept are reflected in the TCB.
However, a TCB is quite different. First, the TCB includes additional security supporting
functions (SSF) such as password maintenance, providing a security administrator
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interface, and audit retrieval and analysis. Second, the TCB always refers to an automated




Figure 3. TCB Architecture.
B. SECURITY MODELS
A security model precisely defines the security policy, relating it to the overall
behavior of the system. The primary purpose of a security model is to provide a precise
mathematical description of a security policy in terms of system level operations designed
to successfully implement the policy's requirements [Ref. 12]. A sound security policy
model should be precise and unambiguous, easy to comprehend, and deal only with
security; it should not constrain the principle function of the system. This section outlines
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three traditional security models. In a subsequent chapter we will discuss MSHN in the
context of a more complex security policy.
1. Graham-Denning Model
The Graham-Denning model [Ref. 13] is a formal description of Protection Rules
(see Figure 4) along with an Access Control Matrix (ACM) (see Figure 5), designed to
enforce a discretionary security policy. These protection rules relate a set of subjects, a
set of objects, and a set of access rights. There are eight Protection Rules.
• Create an object. Governs the creation of an object.
• Delete an object. Governs the deletion of an object by a subject.
• Create a subject. Governs the creation of a subject.
• Delete a subject. Governs the deletion of a subject by a subject.
• Read access right. Governs the reading of a subject's access right to an
object.
• Delete access right. Governs the deletion of a subject's access right of an
object.
• Grant access right. Governs the granting of a subject's access right to an
object to another subject.
• Transfer access right. Governs the transferring of a subject's access rights of
an object to another subject.
The ACM (see Figure 5) is constructed with each row representing a subject and
each column representing an object or a subject acting as an object. The model views all
subjects as having this dual existence for the purpose of determining whether a subject can
exercise control (e.g., delete, read access rights, delete access rights) over another subject.
Subjects are also viewed as objects when, in fact, they exhibit the behavior of an object
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(e.g., an executable program when being managed in memory). Each table cell contains
the subject's (row) access rights to the object (column) and reflects the current security
status of the system.
There are five primitive access rights: read, write, execute, control, and owner.
Each object and subject in the ACM is assigned a distinct owner and controller,
respectively. An owner is the subject that has the exclusive owner access right to an
object, and a controller is the subject that has the exclusive control right to a subject. The
Protection Rules use the control and owner access rights to determine whether the actions
listed in Figure 4 may be performed by a given subject.
Command Pre-Condition Effect
Create object O Null Add column for in ACM;
Place owner in ACM[x,0]
Create subject 5" Null Add row for S in ACM; Place
control in ACMfx,0]
Delete object Owner in ACM[x,0] Delete column
Delete subject S Control in ACM[x,S] Delete row S
Read access right ofS to Control in ACM[x,S] or
Owner in ACM[x,0]
CopyACM[S;0]tox




Grant access right R to S to Owner in ACM[x,01 Add/?toACM[5",01
Transfer access right R or R * to
StoO
R* in ACM[x,0] Addflorfl*toACM[S,0]
Note: x represents the subject requesting access right(s)
Figure 4. Protection Rules [Ref. 27].
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Objects
Subjects SI S2 -S3 01 02 03
Control Owner Read
Write
S2 ; Control Read Execute
S3 Control Owner
Figure 5. Access Control Matrix [Ref. 27].
2. Bell and LaPadula Model
The Bell-LaPadula model [Ref. 14] is an information flow model identifying
allowable paths for information flow in a secure system (see Figure 6). This model was









Figure 6. Secure Information Flow.
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It models both mandatory and discretionary security policies. The model describes
a set of subjects S and a set of objects O and a binary access class relational operator
<. For example, ifA < B, the access class of the left operand A is at the same level or
lower than the access class of the right operand B. For every subject s in S, and object o
in O there is a fixed access class C(s) and C(o). (C is a function that returns the access
class of the subject or object.) For mandatory policy enforcement the model presents two
properties that must be maintained. These two properties work conjunctively to prevent
the disclosure of sensitive information and are defined as follows.
• Simple Security Property. A subject s may have read access to an object o
only ifC(o)<.C(s).
• *
-Property (Confinement Property). A subject s with read access to an
object o may have write access to an object/? only \fC(o) < C(p).
3. Lattice Model
The Lattice Model [Ref. 15] is also an information flow model, and is applicable to
Mandatory Access Control security policies. Its unique characteristic is that it is
represented using a mathematical structure called a lattice: a finite set of security classes
and a flow relation, ->, with least upper bound and greatest lower bound operators. The
lattice properties (reflexivity, transitivity, and antisymmetry) permit concise formulations
of the security requirements of different systems and facilitate the construction of
mechanisms to enforce a security policy. In terms of processes, the lattice properties as
described in A Guide to Understanding Security Modeling in Trusted Systems [Ref 12]
are:
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• Reflexivity. A process can access any information it possesses. That is,
information can always flow from a process to itself.
• Transitivity. If information can flow from process Pi to process P2 and can
flow form P2 to P3, then information can flow form Pi to P3.
• Antisymmetry. If information can flow from a process with label Li to a
process L2, and conversely, then Li = L2.
"The model provides a unifying view of all systems that restrict information flow,
enables classification of them according to security objectives, and suggests some new
approaches." [Ref 15] In this model, each node on the lattice represents a particular
security class that is derived from the system's set of security classes. The security classes
may be linearly ordered, nonhierarchically ordered, or a combination of both, as shown in
the lattices of Figure 7. Information may only flow from one node to another if the
following two conditions are met.
• The sending node's hierarchical component of the security class is less then or
equal to the receiving node's hierarchical component of the security class.
• The sending node's nonhierarchical component of the security class is a subset













Nonhierarchical Classes Lattice Combination Lattice
Figure 7. Lattice Structures.
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C. TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA
In designing a secure system one must consider the security objectives described in
the previous section. The question remains as to how to provide a high level confidence
to an organization that their particular system does (or will) correctly enforce the
organization's security policy. Criteria are intended to provide guidance to system
developers. They outline the minimal requirements that must be satisfied in order to
achieve a particular level of confidence that the policy will be correctly enforced. There
are several sets of criteria to choose from: the Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria (TCSEC) [Ref. 9], the Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
(ITSEC) [Ref. 16], the Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria
(CTCPEC) [Ref. 17], and the Federal Criteria/Common Criteria [Ref 18]. In our analysis
of MSHN, we will utilize the TCSEC. This section summarizes the requirements
embodied in the TCSEC.
1. History and Purpose
In 1983 the National Computer Security Center published the DoD Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria, also called the "Orange Book" after the color of its
cover. This document was reviewed and republished in 1985 as DoD standard 5200.28-
STD. The National Computer Security Center (NCSC) was formed in January 1981
under the management of the National Security Agency. Its mission was to expand on the
work started by the DoD Computer Security Initiative of 1977. The NCSC based the
TCSEC upon the evaluation material produced by the National Bureau of Standards and
the MITRE Corporation. [Ref. 9]
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The TCSEC not only provides a rating structure for security evaluation, but also
defines many computer security concepts and provides guidelines for what functionality is
necessary and sufficient for a trusted system. The official purpose as stated in the TCSEC
is threefold:
• To provide guidance to manufacturers as to what to incorporate in their
systems to satisfy the trust requirements of a DoD evaluation,
• To give users a yardstick with which to assess the degree of trust that can be
placed in computer systems, and
• To provide a common basis for specifying security requirements in
acquisitions.
The TCSEC accomplishes its objectives by defining four broad hierarchical
divisions for describing the protection mechanisms that are provided in a given computer
system. These divisions are: D (minimal security), C (discretionary protection), B
(mandatory protection), and A (verified protection). These broad divisions are further
subdivided to reflect varying degrees of security capabilities within each division. These
subdivisions are explained later in this section. Each division is defined by the extent to
which it meets the Fundamental Computer Security Requirements that follow.
2. Fundamental Computer Security Requirements
The Fundamental Computer Security Requirements of the TCSEC are six areas
that delineate what it really means to call a computer secure from a DoD perspective.
These requirements define what is needed to control access to information, and to obtain
accountability and assurance in a trusted computer system.
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a) Security Policy
This requirement states that there must be an explicit and well-defined
security policy enforced by the system. This policy is a set of rules used to determine
whether a given subject can be permitted to gain access to a specific object. It also
mandates that the security policy for systems handling sensitive information (e.g.,
classified messages) requires mandatory access controls as well as discretionary access
controls. [Ref. 9]
b) Marking
This requirement states that access control labels must be associated with
objects. Mandatory access control requires that every object be labeled with an identifier
reflecting its level of sensitivity. Without such labels, mandatory access control cannot be
implemented. [Ref. 9]
c) Identification
This requirement states that individual subjects must be identified before
obtaining access to the system. Information access must be mediated on the basis of the
identity and authorization of the subject requesting the access. Recall that a subject is
defined as an active element that performs some security-relevant action in the system. In
addition, it is required that the system provide for the protected safe storage of the
identification and authorization information. [Ref. 9]
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d) Accountability
This requirement states that audit information must be selectively kept and
protected so that actions affecting security can be traced to the responsible party. It
introduces the concept of an audit log, the repository in which relevant events are
recorded. This log must be protected from unauthorized modification and destruction.
[Ref. 9]
e) Assurance
This requirement states that the computer system must contain
hardware/software mechanisms that can be independently evaluated and provide sufficient
confidence that the system enforces the previous four requirements. As the risk to
information increases, the level of confidence in correct policy enforcement must increase.
This will require the application of rigorous software engineering methods, minimization
of trusted code, and the use of formal methods. [Ref. 9] Configuration management and
trusted distribution are also factors that contribute to assurance in high confidence
systems.
J) Continuous Protection
This requirement states that the trusted mechanisms that enforce these
basic requirements must be continuously protected against tampering and/or unauthorized
changes. It claims that no computer system can be considered truly secure if the
mechanisms that enforce the security policy are themselves subject to corruption. This
requirement states that continuous protection must be provided throughout the computer
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system's life cycle. [Ref. 9] It is a reflection of the "tamperproofhess" explained in the
Reference Monitor Concept.
3. Criteria Summary
As stated earlier, the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria defines four
broad hierarchical divisions for the protection of computer systems: D, C, B, and A.
Division C and B are further decomposed into the following classes: CI, C2, Bl, B2, and
B3. Each division represents a major improvement in the overall confidence one can place
in the system for the protection of sensitive information (see Figure 8). It is important to
note that the criteria are cumulative in that each division of the criteria inherits the security
requirements of the preceding lower levels. In the TCSEC, each criterion division is
presented in detail and lists to what degree it supports the six fundamental security
requirements.
a) Division D: Minimal Protection
Division D only contains the Class D. This division is reserved for all
computer systems that have been evaluated but fail to meet the requirements for a higher
evaluation class. Class D systems cannot be expected to provide any real security or even
protect against human error. [Ref. 9]
b) Division C: Discretionary Protection
Division C contains Class CI and Class C2. Systems in this division
provide confidence to the organization that the Trusted Computing Base is enforcing a
discretionary access control policy. Class CI nominally satisfies discretionary security
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requirements by separating users and data. Some credible controls capable of enforcing
access limitations on an individual basis are incorporated. Class C2 enforces a more
granular form of discretionary access control, making users accountable for their actions
through login procedures, the auditing of security-relevant events, and the isolation of
system resources. [Ref 9]
c) Division B: Mandatory Protection
Division B contains Class Bl, Class B2, and Class B3. Class Bl systems
feature an informal statement of the security policy model, provide for data labeling, and
require mandatory access control over named subjects and objects. Class B2 systems
require the TCB to be based upon a clearly defined and documented formal security
model, and requires that the enforcement of discretionary and mandatory access controls
be extended to all subjects and objects. Additional software engineering requirements are
introduced making this class relatively resistant to penetration [Ref. 9]. The final class in
this division, Class B3, dictates that the TCB substantially implement the Reference
Monitor Concept requirements. From a practical perspective, it is the minimization of the
TCB that contributes most to assurance by reducing the complexity of the TCB, and the
number of components that must be evaluated for correctness. [Ref. 9]
d) Division A: Verified Protection
Division A contains the Class Al. Class Al systems are functionally
equivalent to B3 systems; however, the implementation of formal design specification and
verification techniques is required. This results in a high degree of assurance that the TCB
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is correctly implemented. Also, additional configuration management requirements, such
as trusted distribution, are added into the criteria of this class.
Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Summary Chart
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Figure 8. Comparison of Evaluation Classes [Ref. 9].
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IV. QUALITY OF SERVICE
In the MSHN proposal document [Ref 19], the MSHN team has identified several
"Problem Areas" that require detailed research and examination in order to make MSHN a
success. These Problem Areas include such topics as: Exploiting Heterogeneity,
Accounting for Non-determinism, Resource Sharing, Fault Tolerance, and Managing
Quality of Service (QoS). Security is one of the primary QoS objectives to be provided by
MSHN. As such, this chapter will explore how QoS is defined, what services make up the
QoS domain, and how security impacts the other QoS services. The results of this
analysis will later assist us in developing a security policy for MSHN.
A. QUALITY OF SERVICE PERSPECTIVE
QoS is a difficult concept to explain in definable terms. Webster's dictionary
defines Quality as degree or grade of excellence, and Service as an act of helpful activity.
These lay definitions help us to gain a general understanding of the Quality of Service
notion. Unfortunately, questions still remain. Who determines what helpful activities of a
system are meaningful, and what metrics should be used in evaluating those activities?
The user must ultimately decide the answers to these two questions. If the user is satisfied
with the system, then the designers have done their job in ensuring that their system
provides a high degree of Quality of Service. However, the word "satisfied" is an
extremely vague term. A designer must somehow be able to identify those activities
(services) that comprise the QoS domain, and devise some procedure to quantify the
degree to which those services are supported. The following is a more logical
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methodology for making the identification and measuring of such services tractable (see
Figure 9). This approach is very similar to the Requirement Analysis phase of the System














Figure 9. Process of QoS Identification.
The first task is to identify and classify the users of the system. MSHN envisions
having two general types of users, Execution Users, and Administrators. Execution Users
will be the people who submit their applications to MSHN, and rely on MSHN to properly
schedule and execute their jobs. Administrators will be responsible for ensuring that
MSHN is properly configured and operating correctly. These two types of users clearly
will have different objectives, reasons for using the system, expectations of performance
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and capability, and interaction requirements. This leads us to the next phase of our
methodology.
The next task is to survey what each type of user expects from MSHN. This is the
step where the user articulates what features, properties, and system characteristics are
important to him. Of course the survey responses of the user will be very subjective and
will differ on an individual basis, but it is essential to solicit these opinions. The users are
the ones who define the properties required for each service. In MSHN, the Execution
User may desire a simple and clear interface such as a Graphical User Interface (GUI),
while the Administrator would prefer a powerful and efficient command line interface.
This is an example of conflicting requirements that must be analyzed and resolved by the
designers. Once the survey is complete, the designers must review the list of services.
The last task is for the designers to examine this user-generated list of desired
services to determine if, and to what extent, MSHN can supply these services. Although
this list will contain specific descriptions of desired services, one may find that these
services may be grouped into general categories or dimensions. Creation of a
multidimensional classification system for services will assist the designers in having
MSHN meet the needs of the users. The following is a list of dimensions that make up the
QoS domain. It is certainly not an all-inclusive list but does contain those services that are
common to most user requirements.
1. Functionality
Functionality is probably the most important service a system can provide.
Functionality is what the system can do for the user. If the system provides only limited
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capability, or if what it can do is irrelevant to the user's needs, then the system is useless.
One could measure this Quality of Service by simply comparing the user's requirements to
what the system offers. MSHN definitely will provide the much-needed service of
intelligently managing distributed heterogeneous computational and network resources.
Its functionality will include the capability for users to be able to submit a job, monitor a
job's progress, input specifications and special information related to a job, display a job's
output, receive a job's data, and terminate or dequeue a job.
2. Timeliness
Timeliness is a concern to almost all users. In today's fast food society, the
patience of the typical user is finite. The speed at which the system can process an
application may be of paramount importance to the user. In a real time system, a delay in
processing can cause catastrophic effects resulting in the loss of data, equipment and
possibly even lives. Looking at the other end of the job spectrum (e.g., a simple word
processor application), excessive processing time, when seen in the light of the more
critical effects above, is merely an annoyance to the user. Besides viewing timeliness as a
goal of QoS, it is also an economic issue. Time is a precious resource that can be
quantified in monetary terms. Excessive processing time experienced by users can be
detrimental to an organization's operational budget and mission. MSHN's principle goal
is to effectively and efficiently schedule applications thereby meeting the QoS goals of its
users (e.g., reducing the required time to execute a user's jobs).
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3. Throughput
Throughput is a service that deals with quantity. The amount of information the
system can process, display, transmit, and store determines the level of throughput a
system provides. Some factors that affect throughput are the capacity of the system's
memory and secondary storage, the network channel bandwidth, the rating of the modem,
and the system architecture. Throughput, in the context ofMSHN, will also depend upon
how many users can access MSHN simultaneously, how many resources will be at the
user's disposal, and the limitations MSHN imposes on user job submissions.
4. Dependability
A system is dependable if it is highly available, has a very small recovery time, is
capable of providing uninterrupted services, and assures its users that it solves the
intended problem. Dependability also implies that the system consistently achieves an
expected level of performance. This QoS objective is often taken for granted. The user
does not often recognize or appreciate this highly important service until it is absent. One
of the ways to build dependability into a system is to concentrate on its fault tolerance.
Fault tolerance is the ability to recover from hardware and software component failures
without performing incorrect actions. This field of study incorporates many underlining
issues such as halting failures, fail-stop failures, timing failures, and Byzantine failures
[Ref 21]. The MSHN project recognizes this critical area and has dedicated time and
manpower to resolve problems associated with dependability and fault tolerance.
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5. Security
Security is the ability of the system to enforce a specific policy to protect data,
services, and resources against misuse. This misuse may come from unauthorized users,
malicious programs (e.g., viruses and Trojan Horses) or unintentional user/software
errors. This service is highly coveted by systems that process sensitive, financial, and
military information. Computer security is a diverse and complex subject and was
discussed in greater detail in the previous chapter of this thesis. Because of MSHN's
potential military and commercial application, the designers are determined to incorporate
security into its architecture.
6. Ease of Use
The last QoS element to be discussed is ease of use. If it is easy to use, the users
will have a natural affinity for the system. Ease of use also results in increasing user
productivity. Minimizing the time spent on unproductive user interaction with the system
allows for more beneficial work to be done. In addition, the user is less apt to make
mistakes (e.g., input erroneous data) when a simple, clear interface is supplied. A system
that requires a knowledgeable and proficient user will restrict the number of people who
can use that system. Implementing training programs, supplying reference material, and
creating on-line tutorials can resolve this problem. However, these approaches can be
costly and time consuming. MSHN's predecessor, SmartNet, is intended for an expert
user, but MSHN plans to expand its clientele. Because of this larger and more diverse
anticipated user population, the MSHN project will pay particular attention to its interface
and ease of use.
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B. SECURITY SERVICE IMPACT
It is imperative to realize that the services that comprise the QoS domain are not
orthogonal. These services interact with and are influenced by each other. Compromises
and trade-offs will take place in any system's design. Introducing security into a system
will definitely affect the other QoS elements that the system provides. The magnitude of
that an impact depends on the types of security policies that must be enforced and the
security mechanisms applied in the system. MSHN will not be an exception. Integrating
security with other QoS requirements will certainly impact MSHN's functionality,
timeliness, throughput, dependability, and ease of use.
Incorporating security will rescope the functionality ofMSHN. MSHN will not be
an open system. Restrictions will be placed on a user's access to files, applications,
features, and resources. Their accesses will be controlled by their security clearances and
the permissions they possess. One of the most significant changes will be the user's view
of the virtual machine. Users will only be allowed to see those resources to which they are
authorized to access. This view may be only a subset of the entire virtual machine. These
changes to MSHN's functionality will reflect the required security enhancements.
Security will also cause a fundamental change in the timeliness and throughput
provided by MSHN. Security will be considered an attribute of the application. The
scheduler will have to be modified to select resources based on their security attributes in
addition to their other attributes. One ramification is that a more ideal resource with
respect to some other QoS attribute may not be selected for use due to the resource's
inability to meet the application's security requirements. Another timeliness issue results
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from the processing overhead of invoking the reference monitor. Every time a subject
requests access to an object, the reference validation mechanism mediates the request.
This will take time and may lead into a bottleneck situation. The exact cost of this
additional time is difficult to evaluate. At the present stage ofMSHN's development, the
subjects and objects of the system are yet to be defined. The granularity of the objects and
subjects could be high or low. The final determination of this granularity would have a
significant effect on the number of invocations of the reference monitor.
Security will strengthen the dependability of MSHN. As stated earlier in this
chapter, dependability is the stability and availability of the system. One of the reasons a
system can become unstable is the corruption of critical operating system files. By
restricting access to these files and implementing a program integrity security policy, the
probability of this occurring is reduced [Ref. 22]. To ensure availability of the system,
countermeasures can be put into place to guard against denial of service attacks. One
such countermeasure would be to give MSHN the ability to limit a user's utilization of the
system. The length of a particular user session might be bounded. Users might be given a
quota on the number of applications that may be submitted to MSHN. A particular user
application could be allotted a specified quota of time to run on a machine. User identity
and the current system load could determine these time allotments. This apportionment
will help ensure that MSHN and its corresponding resources continue to be available to all
users.
Working with a secure version ofMSHN will change how the user interacts with
MSHN. No longer will the user have unchecked access to the system and the system's
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resources. The user will have to become familiar with the added security mechanisms that
MSHN will contain. These include an identification and authentication login process, the
setting of session levels, and the stipulations of working with discretionary access
controls. Much of this could be automated to preserve MSHN's ease of use (e.g., by
using smartcards, biometrics, or other easy-to-use authentication techniques). Operating
in a multilevel security climate, the user will be subject to certain restrictions and
limitations. For example, if the user wants to submit his application to a resource that is
strictly dominated by the user's session level, he must change his session level. This must
be done to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information. This may become
burdensome if the system contains many security levels and is heavily compartmentalized.
The user may have to change the session level frequently to accomplish his duties. Along
with requiring new system behavior, security will also generate additional administrative
duties. The configuration and maintenance of user accounts, the reviewing of audit trails,
and the security training of users are but a few of the added responsibilities that a secure
system requires.
C. MANAGING THE IMPACT
One of the greatest concerns of the designers ofMSHN is the detrimental impact
that the enforcement of a stringent security policy might have on MSHN's ability to meet
QoS requirements. This is a heightened concern during certain operating conditions when
performance (i.e., the combination of timeliness and throughput) and resource accessibility
are paramount. An example of this would be a military setting where the survivability of
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forces depends on MSHN scheduling and executing a critical application in a timely
manner. When operating within the constraints of an established security policy, MSHN
may fail to meet this requirement. The most appropriate resource to process this critical
application might be inaccessible due to an inadequate number of secure channels or to the
unavailability of personnel cleared to access this resource. In such a scenario the
information and resources ofMSHN's domain are protected but at the cost of lives. This
is unacceptable.
We may have to consider having a polymorphic security policy to cope with this
situation. This polymorphic security policy would have the ability to modify itself based
on the working environment in which the system is operating. Under certain conditions,
where the transmission of information is more crucial than its protection, a lenient security
policy could be instituted. When the focus shifts back to information protection, a more
rigid security policy is reinstated. At the conceptual level, an alteration of the security
policy (no matter of what magnitude) is really a replacement of one policy for another.
Thus a polymorphic security policy is really nothing more than multiple serial polices that
the system has to manage. The difficulties and implications of a multipolicy system are
discussed in Chapter V.
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V. SECURITY POLICIES
A security policy contains the rules and procedures that will regulate how a
system's active entities, acting as surrogates for users, manage, protect, and distribute
information. The formulation of a system's security policy is the first step in building a
secure system. For the proper design ofMSHN it is critical that such a policy be formally
stated. At the current time, no such policy exists. This chapter discusses two fundamental
types of security policies that may be applied to MSHN, namely, DAC and MAC, as well
as a flexible multipolicy based on these. For the first two policies, the chapter focuses on
the identification and the infrastructure of enforcement mechanisms that may be applied to
support these policies within MSHN. The chapter concludes with a discussion of a
multipolicy security policy for MSHN, emphasizing such a policy's characteristics, the
related problem areas that apply to MSHN's design with respect to implementing such a
policy, and recommendations for resolution of these problems. This information will
hopefully assist the designers in creating the appropriate security policy for MSHN and
building effective mechanisms to support this policy.
A. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY CATEGORIES
Access control policies can be delineated into two fundamental types. They are
termed identity-based policies and label-based policies. These two classes are separated




Identity based policies permit or deny access based solely upon the identity of the
subject. Another name for this class of policies is Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
policies. In certain applications areas (e.g., government and military), this type of policy
may be expanded to include additional access rules based on the "need to know" of the
user. For other applications (e.g., commercial and academic computing) identity based
controls are simply presented as a mechanism, available to serve whatever discretionary
access control needs such users might have.
2. Label Based
Labeled-based policies emerge from the assignment of trust, in the form of
clearances, to users and sensitivity levels to information. Within the computer system,
subjects act as surrogates for users and objects are information containers. Each are
assigned immutable access classes. Comparison of subject and object access classes
permits the mediation of access rights by subjects to objects. This class of policies is also
termed Mandatory Access Control (MAC) policies. Enforcement of a MAC security
policy is required of those U.S. government systems that are used to process classified or
other specially categorized sensitive information [Ref. 9].
B. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS OF A DAC SECURITY POLICY
Discretionary security policies are so named because they apply discretionary
access control mechanisms to control the access to information. They are probably the
most common of enforcement policies. For example, they can be found in UNIX,
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Microsoft NT, and Novell operating systems. To better understand discretionary security
policies, it is necessary to examine the requirements, characteristics, and varying forms of
discretionary access control mechanisms that support such policies.
1. Requirements
All implementations of DAC security policies share the ability and the supporting
infrastructure to perform the following fundamental operations. It is important to note
that satisfying this set of requirements is not sufficient even for obtaining a class CI
TCSEC evaluation. However, it is beneficial to identify a subset of "core requirements"
so that we may better understand the mechanisms that support DAC security policies.
The first fundamental operation is that access to objects is based upon user identity.
Secondly, it must be possible for authorized users to grant and revoke authorization, via
some means, to objects under their administrative control. Thirdly, it must be possible for
programs acting for users to grant and revoke authorizations. Lastly, the system must
support the creation and deletion of objects. The exact discretionary access control
mechanism used to satisfy these four requirements depends on the techniques employed,
the defined access types, and the control models implemented. [Ref. 1 1]
2. Discretionary Access Control Mechanisms
There are five commonly used mechanisms that support a DAC security policy.
They are termed capabilities, profiles, access control lists (ACLs), protection bits, and
passwords. This section provides an overview of each of these mechanisms and highlights
some of the advantages and disadvantages of applying them to a system.
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The capabilities mechanism uses a protected identifier (the capability) that is
assigned to both objects and subjects and used to determine access. A subject is only
granted access to a particular object if it possesses the proper capability for that object.
Two fundamental properties of the capabilities mechanism are that a capability can be
passed from one subject to another, and that the capability may not be altered or
fabricated without the mediation of the operating system TCB. Capabilities mechanisms
are useful in enforcing the least privilege principle and providing dynamically changeable
domains. The problem with the capabilities mechanism approach is that a passing of a
capability is not recorded. It is difficult to assess who has access to what objects. [Ref.
23]
The profiles mechanism associates with each user a list of protected objects. This
list delineates what objects the user possesses and the type of access he has to those
objects. There are several disadvantages to this mechanism. If the user has access to
many protected objects, the profile list can become very big and difficult to manage.
Creating, deleting, and changing the permitted access to protected objects requires many
operations since multiple user profiles must be updated. As in the case for the capabilities
mechanism, using a profiles mechanism complicates the ability of the system to determine
who has access to an object. [Ref. 23]
The ACLs mechanism takes an approach opposite to that used by the profiles and
capabilities mechanisms. The ACL mechanism associates each protected object with a list
of identities (e.g., users and groups). This list is referred to as the object's ACL. The
access modes allowed for each identity are kept in the ACL. An advantage of this type of
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mechanism is that the list need not be excessively long if groups are used. Groups are a
way of grouping multiple users into a single list entry. All members of a group share the
privileges of that group. The use of groups introduces the problem of conflicts between
individual user access rights and group rights. For example, a user may be granted only
read access to an object but through group membership be given both read and write
access to that object. This conflict must be resolved by a precedence schema to evaluate
group and user access privileges in an ACL. [Ref. 23]
The protection bits mechanism is a degenerate form of the ACL mechanism. This
method uses protection bits associated with objects instead of a list of users who may
access an object. An example of the use of this technique is found in the UNIX operating
system. In UNIX, the protection bits are grouped into three fields: owner, group, and
public. The fields contain the access rights respectively for the owner of the object, a
group, and the public (i.e., all users of the system). Each field is further subdivided into
three bits, namely read, write, and execute. The value of a given bit indicates the
authorization for the associated access right. For example, if the read bit of the group
field is set to 1, the members of the group have read access to the object. An advantage of
this technique is that it is easy to implement and manage. The disadvantage is that it lacks
ability to conveniently control the access to an object at the granularity of a single user.
[Ref. 23]
The password mechanism utilizes passwords to mediate access to each object with
particular rights. A subject requesting access to the object must supply the correct
password in order to gain access. The difficulties associated with this protection
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mechanism are the daunting demand put upon the user to remember all the passwords, the
requirement for the selection of strong passwords, the need for changing passwords often,
and the ramifications of revoking a user's access rights. [Ref 23]
3. Access Modes
The access modes associated with an object specify what specific operations a
subject can apply to that object. Numerous types of access modes are used by various
discretionary access control mechanisms, but most can be found to be derivative of a few
simplified access modes. The following are those basic access modes as described in A
Guide to Understanding Discretionary Controls in Trusted Systems [Ref. 23].
• Read. This access mode allows an object to be read but not changed in any
way. On most systems the read mode also allows the object to be copied.
• Write. Subjects are allowed to modify, add, or delete the contents of an object
in any manner but does not allow the user to view the object.
• Write-Append. Subjects are allowed to expand an object but not allowed to
change the previous contents of or view the object.
• Execute. Subjects are allowed to run the object as an executable file.
• Delete. Subjects are allowed to delete an object.
• Null. No access permissions are granted. It is used to allow the exclusion of a
particular user in an ACL.
• Control. The subject is allowed to pass access permission for an object and to
set the access modes to the object for other subjects.
• Control with passing ability. This is identical to the "control" access mode
with the exception that the holder can pass his control permission to other
users.
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Of the modes described above, read and write are fundamental. Other access
modes are constructed using additional mechanisms and combinations of read and write
access.
4. Control Management Models
How control permissions (control, and control with passing ability) are managed in
a system further dictates how information is regulated. A system may take a lenient
posture and allow all users to have control permissions. This results in a very dynamic
system where access changes to objects occur frequently. Alternatively, a system may
allow only one user to have control permission. This results in a fairly static environment
where changes to access are centrally controlled. Typically, systems apply one of four
control models. They are termed hierarchical, concept of ownership, laissez faire, and
centralized.
The hierarchical model implements a tree structure to manage control permissions.
Objects are mapped to the nodes of a tree. If a subject has control permissions to an
object at a particular node, it can control the access to objects located on all descendent
nodes. The advantage of this model is that the mapping of users to the nodes can mimic
the organizational structure of a large enterprise. Therefore, control can be placed at the
most trusted and appropriate level.
The concept of ownership model requires that only one user is the owner of an
object, in most systems this being the creator of that object. The owner is the only one
with control permissions to the object. He is not able to pass that control to any other
user without transferring his ownership rights as well. This eliminates any confusion
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concerning who controls access to each object, but also places the burden on the owner to
grant and revoke access to the object by other users.
The laissez-faire model permits any user with "control with passing ability"
permission to an object to exercise that right without interference from the system. This
enables the user possessing such a right to pass that permission on to any other user he
deems appropriate. This can result in an object having multiple controllers, each with the
ability to modify its access rights. The major disadvantage of this model is that it is
difficult to track the propagation of access rights because there are no constraints placed
on the control of right passing.
The centralized model is similar to the concept of ownership model with the
exception that there is only one owner for all of the objects in the system. Normally, in
most systems, the administrator is that user. No other user can possess control permission
to any of the objects in the system because the "control with passing ability" access mode
does not exist. The advantage of this model is its tight control of access permissions.
However, like the concept of ownership model, a significant burden is place on the
controlling user to satisfy requests for access to objects by the users of the system.
5. Fundamental Flaw
The fundamental flaw of a DAC security policy is that it is vulnerable to Trojan
Horses. "A Trojan Horse is a computer program with an apparently or actually useful
function that contains additional (hidden) functions that surreptitiously exploit the
legitimate authorizations of the invoking process to the detriment of security or integrity."
[Ref. 24] A Trojan Horse may cause actions, including the transfer and modification of
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data, that the user is unaware of and normally would not authorize. In most systems,
programs that are executed by a user inherit all the rights of that user. Because it is
hidden from the user but possesses that user's access rights, a Trojan Horse is able to
exploit a DAC system.
C. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS OF A MAC SECURITY POLICY
Mandatory security policies are so named because they are global and persistent.
The majority of systems requiring MAC policy enforcement are U.S. Government
systems. The data that are handled by systems using MAC mechanisms are generally
sensitive. This data sensitivity generally results from the topic of the information or its
source. To better understand mandatory security policies it is necessary to examine the
principle requirements ofMAC mechanisms, the labels they employ, and trusted subjects.
1. Requirements
The following are required features of MAC mechanisms. There exists a finite
system of labels that are given to objects and subjects. The labels must not be modifiable
by normal system users or by subjects operating on their behalf. There exists a relation,
the dominance relation, that partially orders the labels. This partial ordering is described
in the Lattice model [Ref.15] presented in Chapter III. The two fundamental access
modes, read and write, are granted in accordance with the Simple Security Property and
the Confinement Property. The Simple Security Property allows a subject to read an
object only if the label of the subject dominates the label of the object. The Confinement
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property allows a subject to write to an object only if the label of the object dominates the
subject.
2. Labels
Sensitivity labels are used to provide the identification of both system users and
data stored within the system. "A user's sensitivity label specifies the sensitivity level, or
level of trust, associated with that user; it's often called a clearance. A file's sensitivity
label specifies the level of trust that a user must have to be able to access that file" [Ref.
25]. The sensitivity labels that are used by MAC policy enforcement mechanisms
generally consist of two components. These components are classifications and
compartments.
The standard classifications traditionally used by the DoD military model represent
a hierarchical relationship (see Figure 10), whereas the compartments used represent a
non-hierarchical relationship (see Figure 11). The system of classifications is said to be
hierarchical because the classification labels can be arranged in a linear sequence of
increasing dominance. Compartments are considered to be a set. When a particular
access class both hierarchically dominates and contains all of the compartments of another
access class, it dominates that class. The labels on data, or objects, may consist of both a
classification and a compartment category. The object's sensitivity label must have a
single classification component from one of the hierarchical classification categories. In
addition to the classification component, the object's sensitivity may have zero or more
compartment components. In order for the user, or subject operating on his behalf, to be
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Figure 1 1 . Compartments.
3. Trusted Subjects
A trusted subject is a subject that is permitted by the system's reference validation
mechanism to violate the Confinement property. In basic terms, a subject is allowed to
read information at a higher access class and write it to a lower class. Trusted subjects are
internal to the Trusted Computing Base and used to perform necessary functions that
would otherwise be prohibited. An example of one of these functions is the downgrading
of information.
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D. MULIPOLICY SECURITY POLICY
Multipolicy Security Policies (MSPs) coordinate the enforcement practices of
multiple security policies when they coexist in the same system. They are metapolicies,
meaning that they govern the implementation and interactions of policies. MSPs are
responsible for determining a policy's domain (i.e., what objects and subjects apply to
each security policy), integrating one policy with another, and resolving conflicts between
the various security policies. How MSPs can be viewed, how they work, and what are
some of the special concerns associated with MSPs are the topic of this section.
Potentially, the MSHN development team, driven by the purpose and QoS goals of
MSHN, might be faced with the need to develop a MSP. MSHN will employ numerous
resources that will be allocated to support the execution of user applications. If a resource
has a security policy incompatible with that ofMSHN' s, a MSP must be present in MSHN
to allow that resource to be useable. The second catalyst for a MSHN MSP is the
possibility, proposed at a MSHN Investigators meeting [Ref. 5], of MSHN having the
ability to alter its security policy to improve performance. This security rheostat implies
that MSHN will have to enforce several security policies at any given time.
1. Viewing the Multipolicy system
Multipolicy systems can be characterized in one of two ways. The first view is of
multiple individual security policies working together in a predictable way independent of
the state of the system. The other is of policies working together with predictable
behavior dependent on the state of the system.
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The first view may be thought of as a composition of policies resulting in one
unifying traditional security policy. The reason to describe this unifying security policy as
traditional is because of its consistent behavior. The set of rules for controlling the access
and dissemination of information as defined by the unifying security policy is unalterable
and is consistent throughout all states of the system. This immutability of the security
policy is a prevalent, and more often required, attribute in traditional security policies. An
example of this view is found in systems at TCSEC class B3 and higher. These systems
enforce discretionary, mandatory, and supporting policies. Each policy has its own set of
rules and security goals, but they work in harmony to achieve a consolidated and
consistent security policy for the system they are protecting.
We introduced the other view in the previous chapter, namely that of a
polymorphic security policy. To review, a polymorphic security policy is one in which
multiple individual security policies are enforced in concert. The system is able to manage
these policies in such a manner that from the external perspective it appears as if there is
only one security policy (i.e., a super policy) being enforced at a given time. This super
policy may be a combination of the individual policies or it just may be the one security
policy that is being enforced at that moment. This view differs from the unifying view in
that this super policy may change during the course of the system's operation. By
changing the security policy and corresponding protection mechanisms, the behavior of
the system has, in effect, been changed. The tranquility property associated with the label
used to enforce traditional MAC security policies is no longer valid. A polymorphic
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security policy suggests that we shift our way of thinking about the security policy
objectives, requirements, and rules of operation.
Both of these views may be applied to MSHN. The unifying security policy view
describes how MSHN should operate with resources that follow different security policies.
The polymorphic security policy view permits the implementation of a "security rheostat"
mechanism into MSHN.
2. Mechanics of Multipolicies
Modeling the Multipolicy Machine [Ref 26], by David Bell, illustrates a method
of treating the difficulties associated with a system that supports multiple security policies.
The notions of what he terms policy combination, policy conflict, conflict resolution, and
policy precedence are discussed. These notions map very well to our two views ofMSPs
and are, in fact, the motivation for the conception of the two views.
The majority of the concepts presented by Bell can be used to describe the
workings of what we term our unifying security policy view. He describes a process for
representing the multipolicy. This process uses a "policy combiner," essentially a mapping
function, to fuse all of the policies into a single policy (i.e., a unifying policy). This
unifying policy associates every calculation (request for access) with a value (e.g., must,
may, cannot). If there is a conflict (i.e., one policy allows a particular action while an
other does not) between a security policy and the unifying policy, it is resolved by one of
two methods. The first is the selection of another policy combiner that does not produce
conflicts. The other is through the process of policy attenuation, where the policy in
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conflict is asked if it can accept the decision of the unifying policy. If it cannot, another
policy combiner is used and the process repeats itself until all conflicts are resolved.
The idea of policy evolution raised by Bell can be applied to our polymorphic
security policy view. He also does not view the swapping of one security policy for
another as a complete procedural replacement. Instead, the system recognizes and
enforces all of the security policies defined by the designers. How the system is able to
interact with the multipolicies is governed by a concept he terms policy precedence. Each
policy is associated with a precedence value. There are two distinct forms of the policy
precedence concept, absolute-precedence and conflict precedence. Absolute precedence
allows for a specified policy to dominate all others. The system recognizes the policy with
the highest precedence and ignores all others. To the outside world, this gives the
appearance that the system is a single policy machine. To change the security policy that
the system is abiding by, one would change the precedence attributes of the various
policies, maximizing the precedence of the desired security policy. The other form,
conflict precedence, allows for the combing of the multiple security policies into one
policy. If there is a conflict between policies, the policy with the higher precedence is
favored. [Ref. 26]
3. Polymorphic Security Policy Implications
Policy evolution provides insight as to how to model a multipolicy system but it
does not reveal the negative implications of changing the dominant security policy.
Switching security policies may have a disastrous affect on the operation of a system.
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This section discusses these issues and provides some recommendations to help mitigate
the negative consequences of policy evolution.
The security policy determines how information and computing resources are to be
used. Change the security policy (and the applicable enforcement mechanism) and
information flow may occur that was previously restricted. Sensitive information may be
revealed, previously protected files may be modified, and system vulnerabilities may be
exposed. These actions are allowed when a less restrictive security policy is dominant but
become violations when a more confining security policy is reinstated. An important
question is whether the reinstated more restrictive security policy concerns itself with the
past access decisions of the previous governing security policy? This question is left to
the designers of the system to answer.
If the designers do decide to include a mechanism to correct the actions of the
previous security policy, they will be faced with numerous difficulties. The foremost is
that of trying to revoke access to, and possession of, information to which subjects may no
longer be authorized to have access in accordance with the new security policy. Problems
associated with this scenario include identifying such information, locating it, and effecting
its recovery. A subject may have made several copies of the information and may have
sent it around the world via the Internet. There is no way to provide complete assurance
that all the information will be reclaimed.
Another obstacle to switching the security policy deals with the access attributes of
objects (e.g., permissions or labels) and how such attributes translate from one security
policy to another. For example, if a DAC policy is enforced, objects are not marked with
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a label indicating its sensitivity. If that policy is replaced with a MAC policy, how does
MAC adjudicate access without the existence of such labels?
To resolve these issues the following must be considered. Selection of the security
policies must be carefully and methodically undertaken. One must fully comprehend the
potential effects and ramifications of each policy. Maintaining an audit trail throughout all
changes of policy is essential for determining what actions were taken. This information
may prove to be invaluable and necessary in resuming a secure state. The protection of all
the security mechanisms (e.g., auditing log, RVM, encryption devices, and trusted
subjects) must be maintained with every change of policy. There must be assurance that
the governing mechanisms are working properly and are not corrupted due to a policy
change and consequent actions. Lastly, the object labels must be compatible for all of the
security policies. This may result in having one standard label that is associated with each




Interfaces are important, they reflect, facilitate, and mediate the functionality of the
system. To most users, the interface is the system. The interface development process is
an integral part of the system design process. This chapter analyzes the interface of
SmartNet version 2.6. This study is not conducted from the customary usability viewpoint
but instead from a security perspective. By taking this approach, we hope to gain insight
about the security issues pertaining to a scheduling framework. This chapter begins with a
discussion of the aspects of the interface we are examining and the basis of the
examination. An abridged overview of SmartNet' s interface is provided followed by the
identification of the security weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the interface. The chapter
concludes with recommendations for resolving the exposed security liabilities. The lessons
learned and suggestions noted will assist in the development of the MSHN interface(s).
A. SECURITY STANDPOINT
The approach of our study of the SmartNet interface will be from a security
standpoint. This security perspective can best be illustrated by the security objectives
described in Chapter III. These objectives insure the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of information. These objectives reflect the security of the system. Features
that either support or conflict with these security properties are the focus of our attention.
To discuss the confidentiality and integrity of SmartNet, we need to look at the
SmartNet interface-allowable actions that result in a user gaining access to information,
applications, and resources. It is important to note that these actions can be autonomously
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caused by SmartNet as well as by the user interacting with the interface. An example of
instigation of such an action is in the transmission of messages to the user about the states
of currently running applications. This supply of information is not explicitly requested by
the user but is sent automatically. Actions caused by the user include the activation of
menus, the entering of data in dialogue boxes, and the opening of files. These actions, no
matter how complex, can be reduced to some combination of two types of accesses,
reading, and writing. Reading is the transfer of information from one entity to another,
while writing is the modification of information.
In support of insuring confidentiality and integrity objectives, we need to look at
how SmartNet' s mechanisms assure the proper identification and authentication of its
users and assure the certainty of transmissions. The form of the mechanisms, their
strength (resistance to subversion), and, most importantly, the user-machine interface
presented by these mechanisms are of interest to this study. In a network system, these
mechanisms will involve cryptographic communication protocols for intercomputer
security as well as those involved with internal computer security.
In looking at availability, we need to determine those actions permitted by the
interface that may result in a denial of service attack. Denial of service attacks may be
caused directly by a user's action, such as overloading SmartNet with numerous spurious
jobs, or by less direct means that manifests themselves in a more covert fashion. An
example of a less obvious attack is one in which a user corrupts the historical data that
SmartNet collects resulting in a serious degradation in SmartNet' s performance.
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B. SMARTNET INTERFACE
The SmartNet interface consists of three primary Graphical User Interface (GUI)
processes. They are the Editor, the Monitor, and the Runner. Each of the primary GUI
processes has multiple "views" that the user can access (see Figure 12). Each view has its
own unique, purpose, appearance, and functionality. These views allow the user to
interact with and manage the SmartNet environment. In SmartNet all users have the same
privileges. SmartNet assumes that the user is knowledgeable about the local site's
machine and network characteristics visible from that site, and about the remote machines
that can be accessed [Ref. 2]. This high level of user aptitude is required so that he may
accurately enter the compute characteristics of his applications. SmartNet' s ability to
perform effectively depends on the accuracy of this data. The user has access to all the








Figure 12. Structure of SmartNet's Interfaces.
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1. Editor Interface
The Editor allows the user to interactively edit the SmartNet database, which
contains information about the applications (user jobs), machines (potential resources),
sites (location where machines reside), and networks from which SmartNet generates its
schedules. The Editor provides the abilities to both query and send updates to the
database. The Editor consists of five distinct views (see Figures 13 through 17). These
are the Applications window, Machines window, ApplicationMachines window, Overrides
window, and the Sites window. Each Editor window serves a specific purpose and
provides the user with the supporting functionality listed in Figure 18.
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Applications Purpose: Allows the user to describe applications to be scheduled and identify machines.
Capabilities:
• Add Applications Editor Object Type (EOT)
• Read the name of applications
• Enter application's textual description
• Indicate idempotentcy of application
• Enter application's Compute Characteristics
• Modify application's Compute Characteristics
• Delete machine on which application can run
• Add machine on which application can run
Machines Purpose: Allows the user to specify the attributes of the machines to be schedules.
Capabilities:
• Add Machines EOT
• Enter machine's architecture description
• Enter machine's purchase price
• Read number ofjobs scheduled or running on a machine
• Read time until all jobs scheduled are completed
• Enter machine's textual description
Enter machine's location within a site
Enter machine's site location
Indicate fictitious or real machine
Read the name of machines
AppMach Purpose: Allows the user to view and edit the compute characteristics and experiential
data associated with the user application and machine combination to be scheduled.
Enter DataUse Equations
Read name of machines
Capabilities:
• Add ApplicationMachine EOT
• Read name of applications
• Enter group name of application machine combination
• Read Mean value for computer and network experiential data records set
• Read Variance value for computer and network experiential data record set
• Read Weight value for computer and network experiential data record set
• Read Upper Bound value for computer and network experiential data record set
• Read Sum ofSquares value for computer and network experiential data record set
• Read Compute Characteristics for computer and network experiential data record set
• Read Counter for computer and network experiential data record set
• Enter Computer Equations and Network Equations
Overrides Purpose: Allows the user to set parameters for the user application to be scheduled.
Capabilities:
• Read names of applications • Modify overall weighting of the compute information
• Read names of machines • Modify overall weighting of the network information
• Enter execution, network, and data use function of the ETC
Sites Purpose: Allows the user to describe a machine's site characteristics
Capabilities:
• Add Sites EOT
• Enter site description
• Enter site latitude and longitude
• Add, delete machines at site
• Indicate fictitious or real machine
• Enter latency
• Read status of site
• Enter bandwidth
Figure 18. Editor Windows Capabilities.
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2. Runner Interface
The Runner permits the user to schedule and run jobs on a given VHM. It also has
the capability to generate only a schedule (without executing it) for planning purposes.
The Runner interface consists of two views, the SmartNet Users Guide [Ref 2] terms
these views as the Runner window (see Figure 19) and the "Job Info" window (see Figure
20). The Runner window lets the user select the applications to be executed, specify the
number of iterations each job will execute, select the machines that compose the VHM,
and choose a scheduling algorithm. The "Job Info" window, which is a subwindow of the
Runner window, allows the user to enter more specific information concerning all the
applications. This information encompasses dependency, priority, compute characteristic
values, and command line entries for each application. While operating in the Runner
interface the user is able to access the Monitor interface.
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Figure 20. "Job Info" window.
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3. Monitor Interface
The Monitor presents the user with a real time look at the jobs that are currently
running and scheduled to be run by SmartNet. It is strictly a passive interface. The user is
not able to manipulate the state of SmartNet in any way. The Monitor consists of two
views, the Monitor window (see Figure 21), and the "Task Info" window. The Monitor
window displays, in bar graph form, all jobs currently scheduled and indicates the
machines on which they are scheduled to run. Each bar represents a job. The jobs
currently executing are distinguished from waiting jobs by a flashing bar. The "Task Info"
window is activated from the main window by clicking a job's bar. The "Task Info"
window displays additional information pertaining to that job such as name, duration, start
time, and status.
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Figure 21. Monitor window.
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C. VULNERABILITY AND WEAKNESSES
Our examination of the security inadequacies of the SmartNet interface is
organized by reviewing each of the three primary interfaces: the Editor, Runner, and the
Monitor. Security problems common to all of the interfaces are noted as well as those
distinct to a particular interface. Specific examples of features that expose SmartNet to
potential security threats are highlighted and their consequences explained.
1. Common Security Problems
There are several security weaknesses shared by all of the three primary interfaces.
The first is that there is no identification and authentication procedure. Users are not
required to uniquely identify themselves to SmartNet. As result, control over the access
to information, either by discretionary or mandatory means, cannot be accomplished.
Subject identity and associated rights must be established for the proper mediation of
information access. Without this feature it is impossible to uphold any of the security
policies and assign accountability to users for their actions.
The second mutual security deficiency is the all-encompassing capability of any
user to view the information pertaining to any job, and to manage all of the applications
and resources of SmartNet. Jerome Saltzer and Michael Schroeder expostulate on the
design principle of "least privilege." [Ref. 27] This principle states that every program and
user of the system should have the least set of privileges necessary to complete their job.
The "least privilege" principle limits the damage that can result from human accident or
program error. In a military setting, this principle can be compared to the security rule of
"need-to-know."
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The third weakness is the absence of an audit trail. "An audit trail is a
chronological record of system activities that is sufficient to enable the reconstruction,
reviewing, and examination of the sequence of environments and activities surrounding or
leading to an operation, a procedure, or an event in a transaction from its inception to final
results." [Ref. 28] So long as the audit mechanism is not subverted, the audit trail will
allow a penetration of SmartNet to be detected and future penetrations deterred by
revealing any misuse of the system.
The final security weakness is that information transmitted via the network is not
encrypted and therefore susceptible to interception. This could lead to replay attacks (the
passive capture of a data unit and its subsequent retransmission), masquerade attacks
(where one entity pretends to be another), and the modification of data.
2. Editor Security Problems
The overarching security problem with the Editor interface is that it allows the user
to modify all aspects of all the applications and resources of the VHM. This user control
of vital information governing the proper execution of applications is unchecked by
SmartNet. The user is able to directly affect SmartNet' s ability to schedule by modifying
information stored in the SmartNet database pertaining to jobs that may or may not belong
to him.
Specifically, the user can alter a number of application and resource parameters
that will have adverse effects on the operation of SmartNet. The user can change the
compute characteristics of an application in the Applications window causing SmartNet to
improperly schedule the application. He may redirect transmissions (e.g., job execution
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commands or job results) by changing the Internet address of the machine in the Machines
window. He may create bogus applications, machines, and sites, in the Applications,
Machines, and Sites windows, respectively, to confuse the other users of SmartNet. He
may change the SmartNet server to site bandwidth settings in the Sites window causing
SmartNet to miscalculate the impact of the network. He may input unrealistic values for
the Compute and Network weight thereby altering the results of the SmartNet' s Estimated
Time to Completion function. All of the above actions are not restricted to either
SmartNet nor its users.
3. Runner Security Problems
The Runner interface restricts the user to only those operations relating to the
execution of his jobs. However, the user does have the capability, via the interface, to
indirectly affect the other users of SmartNet. The functionality of the Runner interface
exposes SmartNet to three security vulnerabilities: the denial of service, the corruption of
historical data, and the exploitation of the resources of the VHM.
The first security vulnerability of the Runner interface is that it allows a user to
conduct a denial of service attack. A user may interrupt the operation of SmartNet by
resetting the server. This is done by using the Schedule pull down menu on the Runner
window and selecting Reset Server. This will cancel all of SmartNet's currently running
and scheduled jobs. This means that all jobs, including those of other users, are
terminated. The user may also conduct a denial of service attack through a less overt
method. This is achieved by submitting an unusually large number of jobs for execution.
He may target an individual machine or a selected group of machines by selecting them as
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the execution platforms. This overloading of jobs will cause an excessive delay in the
processing of other users' jobs.
Unlike the Editor, the Runner does not allow the user to modify the SmartNet
database directly, but it is possible to do so indirectly. The SmartNet database contains a
historical track record of the performance and needs ofjobs. Each time a job is executed,
SmartNet records runtime information. It uses that information in the future scheduling of
that specific executable. A user could submit to SmartNet a series of a particular
executable and provide bogus parameteric and characteristic information (i.e., compute
characteristics and dependency information). This bogus information would result in poor
performance for that job. SmartNet would incorporate this corrupt data into the collective
job information contained in its database. This corruption of the job's runtime will
adversely affect what SmartNet sees as the characteristics of that job, and so, the ability of
SmartNet to schedule that job.
The last security weakness is that the Runner interface exposes resources to
potential exploitation. Specifically, the "Job Info" window permits the user to enter
commands that will be received at the resource tasked to execute that job. The purpose of
this feature is to associate the application and its related parameters to the resource tasked
to execute that application. This information is required for the execution of the job at the
resource. The user could use this feature to enter in commands intended for harmful
purposes.
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4. Monitor Security Problems
The Monitor's interface function, to provide a real time overview of the VHM,
poses two security problems. These problems are violations of the Simple Security
Property (a property of the Bell and LaPadula security model discussed in Chapter III) and
facilitation of inference.
The Monitor interface allows a user to view the application names, start times,
durations, job identifications, predicted times to finish, status, number of iterations, and
the assigned machines. The Monitor interface also displays information about the
machines running the applications, such as their machine name and network address. This
information may be sensitive and therefore should only be available to users with the
proper clearance and need to know. This ability for a user, in particular one without the
proper clearance, to read sensitive information violates the Simple Security Property. A
less overt manner in which information may be illegally passed between a high user, that
is, one operating at a high security level (e.g., secret), and a low user, one operating at a
low security level (e.g., unclassified), is through a prearranged signaling protocol. The
high user may signal the low user by submitting a job to a specific machine. The number
of jobs that are submitted to that machine, the time submitted, and the name of the job
itself could all convey information to the low user.
The last security problem is that the Monitor interface supports inference.
Inference is "the occurrence when a user is able to deduce information to which they do
not have privilege from information to which they do have privilege." [Ref. 24] For
example, a low user observes that SmartNet has tasked the machines at a military high
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security site with an extraordinary number of jobs. The low user may be able to deduce
that the military is utilizing the resources managed by SmartNet to prepare for an
impending conflict. The military's order to maintain silence about the operation and
preserve the element of surprise is subverted.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
This sections outlines recommendations to counteract the previously noted
security weaknesses in SmartNet' s interfaces and operation principles. The first three
suggestions are required features of all systems rated Class C2 and higher in the TCSEC
classifications [Ref. 9]. The last recommendation addresses the separation of user from
system administrative capabilities in SmartNet' s interface.
The first recommendation for a more secure SmartNet is the insertion of an
Identification and Authentication (I&A) mechanism into the system and the interfaces. An
I&A procedure involves the user establishing a communication path to SmartNet,
identifying himself, and then supplying one or more authentication elements as proof of his
identity. SmartNet, using the claimed identity and authentication elements as parameters,
would then validate the supplied information against that contained in an authentication
database (e.g., a password file). If satisfied with the verification process, SmartNet
establishes the user's session. SmartNet must also protect the I&A data. I&A data
transmitted during a login session is vulnerable to interception (like most transmissions).
Protection of this transmission could include physically securing the wires between the
user and the I&A mechanism (not feasible for a configuration of SmartNet that includes
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resources that are dispersed throughout the country) or applying a cryptographic protocol
to the transmission. Implementation of an Identification and Authentication process will
ensure that only authorized users have access to SmartNet. It will also facilitate the
incorporation of the remaining recommendations. [Ref. 29]
The second suggestion is the development and implementation of an Audit Trail
mechanism. The audit trail will serve five primary functions. It will allow the review of
patterns of access to individual objects, the discovery of repeated attempts to bypass the
protection mechanisms, and the discovery of users assuming greater privileges (e.g., a user
assuming the system administrator role). The audit trail will act as a deterrent against a
perpetrator habitually attempting to bypass SmartNet' s protection mechanism and also
improve SmartNet's ability to control the damage if such attempts are successful. [Ref.
28]
The third recommendation is the enforcement of discretionary access controls.
This will provide a measurable degree of information control within SmartNet. Further
explanation ofDACs and techniques for their implementation are provided in Chapter V.
The last suggestion is to differentiate the user capabilities from the administrative
capabilities. It is clear from this study that the average user (one who uses SmartNet to
schedule his jobs) does not need all the capability that the current interface provides.
However, the system administrator, as the one who ensures SmartNet operates correctly,
does in fact need all of the current capability to carry out his responsibilities.
To accomplish this separation the following process is recommended. Determine
the minimum set of functionality that the user requires in order to submit, configure, and
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execute his applications. Resolve those operations that conflict with the security
principles, such as those noted in the previous section. This resolution may require one or
all of the following: the elimination of some capabilities, the placement of constraints on
the allowable input, or the implementation of some type of error checking procedure
(either automatically or via human intervention). Next, those features that the user deems
"nice to have" should be reviewed for possible inclusion into the user's capability domain.
Here, particular attention should be given to their security implications. A similar process
is then conducted for the administrator's capabilities. The conclusion of this process will




MSHN is a program that is building upon the experience of SmartNet. SmartNet
was designed and constructed as an open system. Its implicit security policy makes no
distinction between users, and their access to information and resources is not constrained
by the system. This simplified system development and maximized functionality,
facilitating the creation of a high performance, flexible, and capable scheduling framework.
The users of SmartNet enjoyed an all-encompassing ability to control and view the entire
VHM.
One may be led to believe that the lack of security in SmartNet is acceptable under
certain operating environments. For example, in a controlled environment where the users
are trusted to do the right thing, the information processed is not of a sensitive nature, and
the connectivity is well-known and regulated, users accept the absence of security. Our
discussion here indicates that these beliefs are unfounded. Infection by Trojan Horses and
viruses, mistakes caused by users, or deliberately malicious activity can occur and
adversely affect the ability of SmartNet to effectively schedule and execute user jobs.
Security does more than protect the dissemination of information. Security ensures the




The following section presents recommendations and future directions for the
incorporation of security into MSHN.
The MSHN design team must first clearly identify the expected customer base and
their intended use for MSHN. From an economic perspective, MSHN must satisfy the
needs of the user in order to be commercially successful. It is user requirements that
ultimately shape the design and functionality of the system. Specifically, it is their security
policy requirements that will lead the design team in determining the degree to which
MSHN will accomplish the three security objectives described in Chapter II, namely
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
This leads to the next recommendation: that a security policy must be defined for
MSHN. As Chapter IV states, it is critical to the proper design of MSHN to formally
state the rules and procedures that will regulate how MSHN manages, protects, and
disseminates information. The articulation of a policy is the first step in building a secure
system. It will characterize the behavior, capability, and the trust of the system. It is
counterproductive to proceed with the application of security mechanisms without this
vital governing statement of intent.
Independent of the type of security policy applied to MSHN, it is sound practice to
incorporate into MSHN's functionality the ability to identify and authenticate users, and
the ability to construct an audit trail. As explained in Chapter VI, these two security
services will deter the penetration ofMSHN by unauthorized users and will contribute to
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the system's ability to make users accountable for their actions. Through the audit trail, it
will be possible to determine which users are using the system improperly.
Another recommendation emerging from Chapter VI is that MSHN should adopt
the philosophy of "Least Privilege." Users of MSHN should only have the ability to
modify those aspects of applications and machines that are part of their responsibility or
concern. Unconstrained malicious actions by some subset of users will impact the correct
operations of MSHN and its ability to schedule jobs appropriately. There must be some
access control mechanism instituted in MSHN to insure the integrity of the system's
management database.
The last recommendation is that the MSHN design team should continue research
and examination of the multipolicy security policy issues presented in Chapter V. MSPs
will enhance the adaptability of MSHN and potentially increase the number of resources
that can be utilized by MSHN. This will increase the effectiveness and marketability of
MSHN. However, multipolicies are a relatively unexplored area. Major challenges
remain to be addressed for multipolicies to be successfully applied to MSHN as discussed
in Chapter V.
C. SUMMARY
The MSHN team has committed to incorporate security into MSHN to promote its
viability, marketability, and trustworthiness. In this thesis we have undertaken the first
steps in realizing this commitment. We have demonstrated how fundamental security
objectives, principles and policies may be applied to MSHN. We have qualified the notion
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of QoS. We illustrated the role of security and its influence over the other services in the
QoS domain. We have stressed the importance and purpose of a security policy, and
presented a discussion of the types of security policies and the available mechanisms for
supporting such policies. We have concluded with a security analysis of the SmartNet
interface such that the vulnerabilities noted might be avoided in the design of the MSHN
interface as well as throughout the architecture.
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